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Joint Powers Revenue Bonds: A Tool for
Intergovernmental Cooperation
in California
By STEPHEN L. TABER*
and
RICHARD W. WHITTAKER**
JUST as fairy tales abound with ugly ducklings that grow into
swans and Cinderellas who become beautiful princesses," so in the
law there are examples of new and important uses being given to stat-
utes which were enacted originally for different purposes.2 Since its
enactment in 1949,1 the joint powers bond provision4 in California has
been such a statute. This provision has been used primarily to avoid
the harsh two-thirds vote requirement for general obligation bonds5
rather than financing joint governmental agency projects. The purpose
of this article is to note the current use of the joint powers revenue
bond as a substitute for general obligation bond financing and the re-
sponse of the state legislature to this use. Finally, some new trends are
observed and certain legislative changes suggested that would restrict
* A.B., 1969, University of California, Santa Barbara; M.P.A., 1971, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles. Assistant Consultant, California Senate Local
Government Committee; Student, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
** A.B., 1962, Sacramento State College. Consultant, California Senate Lo-
cal Government Committee.
1. See H. ANDERSON, FAIRY TALES (1955); C. PERRAULT, COMPLETE FAIRY
TALES (A. Johnson transl. 1961).
2. E.g., Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C.), which has taken on new importance in an environmentally
conscious age. See, e.g., Comment, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in
Control of Water Pollution, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173 (1971); Note, The Refuse Act of
1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 782 (1971).
3. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 84, at 329, revised & re-enacted, Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 329,
at 780.
4. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§ 6540-78 (West 1966), as amended (Supp. 1971).
5. See CAL. CONsT. art. XI1=, § 40.
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the joint powers bond to truly intergovernmental purposes and enable
further expansion in its use.
The Use of Joint Powers Bonds in California
Characteristics of Joint Powers Bonds
The joint power bond provision is an appendage to the Joint Ex-
ercise of Power Act.6  Article one of the act7 basically provides that
two or more public agencies (federal, state, or local) 8 may join together
and form a separate agency (or authority) which may exercise any power
common to the contracting agencies. In practice these joint powers
agencies have been used for many purposes including the construction
of public facilities 9 and the formation of regional planning agencies.'0
Article two of the act 1' provides the authority by which a joint
powers agency may issue bonds for specified purposes.' 2 The scope of
this authority is limited almost exclusively to public buildings and has
had, in practice, little to do with projects of an intergovernmental na-
ture.
Joint powers revenue bonds authorized under the act are generally
sold at a lower interest rate than are bonds which are issued by a semi-
public entity such as a nonprofit corporation. This lower interest rate
is possible because they are municipal bonds which need not receive
approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission and Internal
Revenue Service as to their tax-exempt status as do those of nonprofit
corporations. 3 On the other hand, because joint powers bonds are
theoretically not secured by the full taxing power of the local agencies
involved, they bear a higher interest rate than general obligation
bonds.
14
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6500-83 (West 1966), as amended (Supp. 1971).
7. Id. § 6500-14.
8. For purposes of the joint powers provisions a public agency is defined as
"the federal government or any federal department or agency, this state, an adjoining
state or any state department or agency, a county, county board of education, city,
public corporation, or public district of this state or an adjoining state." Id. § 6500
(West Supp. 1971).
9. See note 75 & accompanying text infra.
10. E.g., the Association of Bay Area Governments and the Southern California
Association of Governments.
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6540-78 (West 1966), as amended (Supp. 1971).
12. Id. § 6546 (West Supp. 1971).
13. Beebe, Hodgman & Sutherland, Joint Powers Authority Revenue Bonds, 41 S.
CAL. L. REV. 19, 58 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Beebe]; see J. STANLEY & R. KrL-
CULLEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW 204 (1971).
14. A. SOKOLow, THE EXTRAORDINARY MAJORITY REQUIREMENT IN CALIFORNIA
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Joint powers bonds are more restricted as to the projects for which
they can be issued than are general obligation or nonprofit corporation
bonds. Until 1965 such bonds could be issued only for exhibition
buildings and sports facilities. Since that time their use has been ex-
tended to "[a]ny other public buildings" and regional parks in Los
Angeles County,15 thereby allowing a large number of capital facilities
to be financed by joint powers bonds.
Joint Powers Bonds as a Substitute for the General Obligation Bond
The common use of joint powers revenue bonds in California has
been for projects which are neither for the joint use of two or more gov-
ernmental agencies nor particularly for revenue producing purposes. 16
The bonds are primarily issued in response to pressure on cities, coun-
ties, and school districts to avoid the constitutionally required two-thirds
voter approval for general obligation bonds.17
The two-thirds vote requirement (which exists in only three other
states) 18 was imposed in 1879 after a period of municipal financing dis-
asters brought on by the extravagant issuance of bonds for internal im-
provements. 9 In recent years, however, the two-thirds vote require-
ment has been seriously questioned. With the present level of fiscal
sophistication of local agencies and their advisers, such a stringent re-
quirement may no longer be needed. Its avoidance has been defended
on the grounds that the requirement thwarts the will of the majority
and that the elected leaders are only carrying out the popular man-
date by financing projects by other means.20
22 (Univ. of Calif., Davis, Institute of Governmental Affairs, Feb. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as SoKoLow].
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6546(d) (West Supp. 1971); i.e. counties of over 4
million population. The provision was so worded in order to comply with CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 16, which prohibits special legislation.
16. There may be some projects that represent true joint ventures, but even these
exceptions tend to follow the pattern of single agency financing. For example, the
Orange County-Westminster Civic Center Authority was formed to construct a civic
center complex which would serve both the City of Westminster and Orange County.
However, the center was financed by two bond issues, one for the city's portion and
one for the county's. See ORANGE COUNTY-WESTMINSTER CIVIC CENTER AUTHoRrry,
Crry BUILDING FAciIrms RPvENuE BONDS, OFnIciAL STATEMENT (Jan. 30, 1967);
ORANGE CoUNTY-WESTMINSTER Civic AUTmoRrrY, COURTHOUSE REVENUE BONDS,
SECOND ISSUE, OFFICA.L STATEMENT (Nov. 4, 1969).
17. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 40.
18. They are Idaho, Kentucky and Missouri. See Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal.
3d 765, 790 n.48, 471 P.2d 487, 505 n.48, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 857 n.48 (1970).
19. See id. at 775, 471 P.2d at 493, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
20. As an example of the dilemma, in the past Several years, an overwhelming
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Attempts to remove the constitutional two-thirds vote provision by
amendment, however, have been unsuccessful. 21  Although the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Westbrook v. Milahy22 invalidated the provi-
sion on the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution because it "discriminates against those who
vote in favor of bond issue propositions, ' 2 this reasoning was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in Gordon v. Lance24 where the
Court stated that "so long as such provisions do not discriminate against
or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause."25
Since legislative and judicial solutions to the problem of the two-
thirds vote requirement have not proved successful, local agencies have
increasingly turned to methods other than general obligation bonds.
The most popular method has been the lease-purchase method of fi-
nancing. This method is a means by which a public or semipublic en-
tity issues revenue bonds26 and constructs a capital facility which is then
leased to another public agency for rental payments sufficient to service
the bonds. Except for the higher interest rate that accompanies reve-
nue bonds,2 7 the result is the same for the lessee agency as it would be if
it had issued general obligation bonds, and the agency has avoided the
necessity of putting the issue to a vote. The lessor entity may be a non-
profit corporation,28 a joint powers agency,29 a retirement fund,3" or
others. Recently enacted legislation3' allows a redevelopment agency,
majority of school bond elections have resulted in failure of the proposed bonds. How-
ever, had a simple majority been required to authorize the bonds, an overwhelming
majority of the elections would have resulted in approval. Beebe, supra note 13, at
29-30 n.39. Of the 135 school bond proposals voted upon in California in fiscal
1970-71, 34 passed and 101 failed. Had only a majority vote been required for
passage, 102 would have passed. California Teacher's Ass'n, Research Bull. No. 264
(Sept. 1971).
21. E.g., Assembly Const. Amend. 1 (1966) would have reduced the % require-
ment to 60% for schools and libraries. It was rejected by the voters in 1966.
22. 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970).
23. Id. at 781, 471 P.2d at 498, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
24. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
25. Id. at 7.
26. See note 99 infra.
27. See 11 CAL-TAx NEws, Sept. 1970, at 3; SOKOLOW, supra note 14, at 19.
28. See Dean v. Kuchel, 35 Cal. 2d 444, 218 P.2d 521 (1950).
29. See Beebe, supra note 13, at 54.
30. See County of Los Angeles v. Byram, 36 Cal. 2d 694, 227 P.2d 4 (1951).
See also Final Report of the Assembly Interim Comm. on Municipal and County Gov-
ernment: Retirement Fund Financing of County Facilities: Lease Purchase Contracts
in 1 APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY (1963).
31. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 271 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
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which already had the authority to issue bonds without a vote,3 to con-
struct a school and lease it to a school district.
The legality of lease-purchase financing has been upheld 33 in Cali-
fornia34 on the ground that a lease is not a debt for the total amount
due under the lease; rather, the lease payments become obligations only
as they become due. 35  However, authorities in the field of lease-pur-
chase financing seem to agree 6 with Justice Edmonds in his disent in
County of Los Angeles v. Byram37 that a lease-purchase agreement is
"no more than a cleverly designed subterfuge to evade the limitations
of. . . the Constitution."
Joint powers revenue bonds are one of the principal means of
lease-purchase financing in California today.38 In order to finance a
facility by joint powers bonds, a local agency must enter into a joint
powers agreement with at least one other agency which: (1) is also
empowered to construct the facility,39 and (2) will derive at least some
theoretical benefit from the project.4" In the agreement, a joint pow-
32. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 33640-44 (West 1967).
33. County of Los Angeles v. Byram, 36 Cal. 2d 694, 227 P.2d 4 (1951);
Dean v. Kuchel, 35 Cal. 2d 444, 218 P.2d 521 (1950).
34. Lease-purchase arrangements are in widespread use in other states. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in McKinley v. Alamogordo Municipal
School Dist. Authority, 81 N.M. 196, 465 P.2d 79 (1969), held that the lease of a
school building to a school district by a nonprofit corporation violated the state's con-
stitutional debt limitation.
35. In City of La Habra v. Pellerin, 216 Cal. App. 2d 99, 102, 30 Cal. Rptr.
752, 754 (1963), the court held that since the money due under the lease for a period
of twenty wears did not become due and payable at one time, "[tlhe lease does not
create an immediate indebtedness for the aggregate amount of the installment rent due,
but on the contrary creates a liability month by month for the consideration ...
within the financial ability of the city to pay; hence the lease does not violate section
18 of article XI of the California Constitution.'
36. See Beebe, supra note 13, at 35: "The basic underlying concept of the
above-mentioned solutions to the financing problems of local government [i.e., lease-
purchase] is that they all avoid the two-thirds vote requirement."
37. 36 Cal. 2d 694, 702, 227 P.2d 4, 9 (1951).
38. On July 1, 1970, 39 joint powers agencies had outstanding bonds totalling
$199,081,000. Controller's Report of Financial Transactions of Special Districts,
1969-70 Fiscal Year.
The Controller's figures do not include the enormous backlog of projects which
have been approved but which have not yet been financed. "If these bonds are all
issued, the total could be approximately one billion dollars." Letter from James Warren
Beebe to Richard W. Whittaker, Dec. 6, 1971.
39. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6546 (West Supp. 1971).
40. See County of Amador v. Huberty, 203 Cal. App. 2d 664, 669, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 816, 819 (1962): "There is no requirement that both of the parties share in
the ownership and operation of any project constructed under the Joint Exercise of
Powers Act." The court went on to say that the furnishing of water to an irrigation
JOINT POWERS REVE NUE BONDSMarch 19721
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ers agency is formed which is given the power to issue revenue bonds,
without a vote of the people, to construct the facility and to lease it to
the governmental agency desiring it.
Voter Controls on Joint Powers Bonds
The California law provides, at present, no requirement for voter
approval for the issuance of joint powers revenue bonds.4 The bonds
are issued by the joint powers agency after being authorized to do so
by ordinance42 of each member entity. Although no vote of the peo-
ple is involved, such action is subject to being rescinded by referendum
in the member entity.43 Since all member entities must authorize the
joint powers agency before it may issue bonds, a successful referendum
in any single member entity would be sufficient to defeat the bond is-
sue. Only a highly organized opposition, however, would be able to
successfully challenge a bond issue by referendum and, therefore, de-
feat is unlikely.
Majority Vote
In 1970 an attempt was made to provide for issuance of joint
powers revenue bonds only after a majority vote in each of the member
entities.44  The bill passed the assembly but died in the Senate Govern-
mental Organization Committee.
In the 1971 legislative session two measures were introduced to
require an election to authorize the issuance of joint powers bonds.
One would have required a vote on all joint powers agreements author-
izing more than $250,000 in bonds.45 However, its author dropped it,
and it was not considered by the legislature. The other, the strictest
control measure yet proposed in California, was in the form of a consti-
tutional amendment. 6 This amendment would have lowered the per-
centage needed to pass a general obligation bond issue from 66% per-
district, thereby increasing the value of land served by the district, would add to the
county's assessed valuation. This would be sufficient benefit to the county to allow it
to participate in the joint powers agreement.
41. CAL. GOV'T CooE § 6546 (West 1966) provides that the bonds shall be au-
thorized by the parties to the agreement.
42. A joint powers agency has no power to issue revenue bonds until it is ex-
pressly authorized to do so by the parties to the agreement. Id. § 6547.1.
43. See text accompanying notes 47-57 infra.
44. Cal. A.B. 2182 (1970).
45. Cal. S.B. 1375 (1971).
46. Cal. S. Const. Amend. 51 (1971).
[Vol. 23
cent to 60 percent and would have imposed the same 60 percent vote
requirement on all joint powers bonds and lease-purchase agreements.
This proposed amendment is, in theory, the only proposal which
takes into account the side effects of the regulation of joint powers
bonds. First, it lowers the percentage needed to approve general obli-
gation bonds, thereby reducing the pressure for utilizing other means
of financing. Secondly, it puts the same limitation on all lease-pur-
chase agreements as it does on joint powers agreements. In this way,
all lease-purchase financing would be placed under the same require-
ments, eliminating the resort to nonprofit corporation bonds that other
joint powers vote proposals might encourage.
The amendment presented a problem because its effect would have
been to discourage intergovernmental cooperation by making separate
projects easier to finance than joint projects. The Revenue Bond Law
of 1941 could be used for financing separate projects, requiring only a
50 percent vote, while the Joint Powers Act, which would have required
a 60 percent vote, would have to be used for joint projects.
The Referendum
Because of the failure of legislation putting joint powers bonds to
a vote, legislation was introduced containing variations of the referen-
dum procedure. One such measure was Assembly Bill 1261, enacted
in the 1971 legislative session as Chapter 721,' 7 which clarifies the
referendum procedure for actions authorizing the issuance of joint pow-
ers bonds. Prior to this act, it was uncertain whether an authorization
to issue bonds was referendable. It has been held that, under the Cali-
fornia referendum provision of the constitution,4" only legislative, as
distinguished from administrative actions of local agencies, are subject
to referendum. 49 The determination of the nature of the act does not
depend on whether it is called an ordinance or resolution, but whether
the act was intrinsically legislative or administrative. There are no
California decisions indicating the nature of the issuance of bonds, and a
47. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 721 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
48. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25 provides: "Initiative and referendum powers may
be exercised by the electors of each city or county under procedures that the Legisla-
ture shall provide ... ." This provision is a reenactment of a 1911 amendment
"without, in the end result, changing the meaning of the provisions." CALIFORNIA
CONsTrrInoN REVISION CMM'N, PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTU-
T10N 49 (1966).
49. See Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 176 Cal. 84, 167 P. 514 (1917); Hopping
v. City Council of the City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 609-10, 150 P. 977, 978-79
(1915); cf. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3750, 4050 (West 1961).
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1924 Texas case5" states that an action to submit bonds to an election
is administrative. However, more recent California cases define a legis-
lative act as one which sets governmental policy, rather than carrying
out present policy.51 This position, combined with a judicial reluctance
to label an act "administrative,""2 would probably lead to the decision
that an act resulting in the issuance of bonds is legislative and therefore
referendable.
Chapter 721 provides that all action to authorize joint powers
bonds shall be taken by ordinance. The ordinance must generally de-
scribe the project, state the maximum amount of the bonds proposed to
be issued, and state that the ordinance is subject to referendum. Those
local agencies which were not already empowered to enact ordinances
were given the power to do so for the purpose of authorizing joint
powers bonds, and those local agencies without publication require-
ments for ordinances were required to publish their ordinances within
fifteen days of adoption. Special district ordinances not otherwise sub-
ject to referendum were made so subject by this act under the proce-
dures set forth for county ordinances. 53  Since, except for cities, there
is no restriction upon the re-enactment of an ordinance after its rejec-
tion by the electorate, the act provides that if an ordinance authorizing
joint powers bonds is rescinded by referendum, an ordinance for bonds
for the same purpose shall not be enacted for a period of one year from
the date of the referendum.
5 4
The importance of this act is not that it requires an ordinance,
since under constitutional referendum the determination of whether an
action is referendable is not one that can be made by the legislature. 55
Rather, the legislature has set forth a statutory referendum56 on joint
50. City of Vernon v. Montgomery, 265 S.W. 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
51. See, e.g., Reagan v. City of Sausalito, 210 Cal. App. 2d 618, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 775 (1962); Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960);
McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 55 Cal. App. 117, 203 P. 132 (1921).
52. See Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1717, 1735 (1966) which suggests that if the matter is contro-
versial, a court should rarely label it "administrative." See also Note, Judicial Limi-
tations in the Initiative and Referendum in California Mfunicipalities, 17 HASTINGs L.J.
805 (1966).
53. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 721, § 3, at 1391-92 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
54. Id. § 4, at 1392.
55. See Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 176 Cal. 84, 167 P. 514 (1917); Hopping v.
City Council of the City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 609-10, 150 P. 977, 978-79
(1915).
56. Cf. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5200 (West Supp. 1971).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
powers bonds which can be invoked whether or not a constitutional ref-
erendum will lie.5"
Senate Bill 1056, enacted as Chapter 464 in the 1971 legislative
session,"' expands the use of revenue bonds by a joint powers agency
to include sewage treatment systems. Since bonds for this purpose are
issued under the Revenue Bond Law of 1941,19 rather than under the
Joint Powers Act, the proposed issuance of bonds must be put to a vote
of the people and must receive a majority of the votes cast. 60  How-
ever, if construction of the facilities in question is required for compli-
ance with a water quality control plan,61 and the regional water quality
control board finds that immediate planning and construction of the fa-
cilities is urgently needed for compliance with the plan, and the board
issues a cease and desist order directing a public agency to cease its
present means of waste discharge, a joint powers agency may issue
bonds by ordinance of its governing body, without a vote of the people,
but subject to referendum.
62
In theory, the requirements of Senate Bill 1056 seem more strin-
gent than those of Assembly Bill 1261.63 Chapter 464 requires as a gen-
eral rule a vote of the people, and it provides an exception only in the
case where it is necessary for a local agency to immediately cease using
its present sewage facilities. However, cooperation between the water
quality control board and the local agency may be expected and the
board could include improved facilities in its plans and issue a cease
and desist order at the request of the local agency so that the latter may
issue its bonds without the voter approval normally required.
There is one important difference between the referendum pro-
vided for in Chapter 721 and that provided for in Chapter 464. In
Chapter 721, which applies only to bonds issued under the joint pow-
ers bond provision, the referendum is not on the bonds themselves but
on the authorization for the local agency to enter into the agreement to
issue the bonds. The issue can be put to a vote by petition of 10 per-
cent of the voters in any one member entity and that entity's participa-
tion in the issuance of bonds can be withdrawn by a majority of those
voting in that entity alone. In this way, the voters of one member en-
57. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 721 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
58. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 464, at 850 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
59. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 54300-16 (West 1966).
60. Id. § 54386.
61. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13142, 13240-47 (West 1971).
62. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 464, at 850 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
63. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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tity may stop the bond issue although it is favored by a majority of the
voters within the joint powers agency as a whole.
Chapter 464 by-passes this referendum provision by utilizing the
Revenue Bond Law of 1941. Therefore, there is no requirement that
the members of the joint powers agency authorize the issuance of the
bonds, which authorization would be subject to a referendum in each
member entity. 64 Both the election and the referendum under Chapter
464 apply to the bonds themselves rather than the authorization to issue
bonds. Therefore, 10 percent of the voters of all the member entities
taken together must sign the petition and a majority of those voting in
all the member entities must vote against the bonds in order to defeat
them. In this way, bonds issued under Chapter 464 are less vulnerable
to defeat than those issued under Chapter 721.
The Need for More Strict Control
The referendum procedure does not provide an adequate substi-
tute for a mandatory vote on joint powers revenue bonds which are
used in place of general obligation bonds. In the larger cities and
counties, it is virtually impossible to obtain the requisite number of
signatures without expensive publicity.65 For example, in the City of
Sacramento, although convention center general obligation bonds were
rejected by the voters twice,66 opponents were still unable to get a ref-
erendum on joint powers bonds for the same purpose. Requiring a
majority vote is the only acceptable means of providing for direct citi-
zen participation in the incurring of debt by joint powers lease-purchase
financing.
The effect of a majority vote requirement upon the financial oper-
ations of local agencies would be difficult to forecast. To many local
agencies the solution to their financing problems would seem to be a
reduction of the vote needed to authorize general obligation bonds from
two-thirds to a simple majority. 67  Many of those who support joint
powers financing as a means of eluding the two thirds requirement pro-
fess a belief that joint powers bonds should not be used for this purpose
unless a majority of the people desire that bonds be issued.68 In such
64. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6547 (West 1966).
65. In Los Angeles County, for example, it would take 231,226 signatures to put
a referendum measure on the ballot. There has not been a referendum measure on
the ballot in Los Angeles County since the procedure was first provided for in 1911.
66. See note 69 infra.
67. See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
68. Testimony of Donald R. Hodgman, Transcript of Public Hearing, Subcomm.
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cases majority vote provisions would not inhibit the use of joint powers
bonds. On the other hand, there is a segment of joint powers bond
supporters who advocate using the bonds for unpopular projects which
would not be approved by a simple majority of the voters. 69 It is this
sort of abuse that should be curtailed.
New and Better Uses for Joint Powers Bonds
Numerous proposals for expansion of the use of joint powers rev-
enue bonds have been considered by the legislature in the past few
years. With the increasing complexity of government at the local level
and the growing urgency of problems that can only be solved by inter-
governmental cooperation, many of these proposals, although not ac-
cepted, have pointed the way toward new and better uses for joint
powers bonds. The most significant of recently proposed extensions
in the use of bonds are in the area of sewage treatment and the gener-
ation of electric power.
Sewage Treatment Facilities
There is a recognized need to construct sewage treatment facilities
on a regional level, both for greater efficiency and to ensure the exist-
ence of a comprehensive water quality control system.70 This need has
become more acute since the passage of the Porter-Cologne Act,71 which
of the Cal. Senate Comm. on Local Government, Joint Powers Agreements 150
(1967).
69. "Many of the projects are necessary to provide the facilities to provide serv-
ices which are not necessarily popular.... [w]e seriously doubt that a majority of
the 3 million voters of Los Angeles County would approve even a few of the above
projects, even though each is to the overall benefit of the county." Letter from Gerald
F. Crump, Deputy County Counsel of Los Angeles County to Senator Clark Bradley,
May 18, 1971.
One project (the Sacramento convention center) was financed with joint powers
revenue bonds after general obligation financing had been turned down twice by a
majority of the voters. Sacramento City Resolution 63-429, declaring result of special
bond election (yes: 14,090; no: 30,774); Resolution 66-279, declaring result of special
bond election (yes: 32,544; no: 41,614); Sacramento County Resolution 69-935 and
Sacramento City Resolution 69-1128, approving and authorizing joint exercise of
powers agreement to create the Sacramento Community Center Authority.
70. "A regional system provides a means to adjust administrative institutions,
capital investment, and abatement practices to the overriding physical imperatives of
streamflow, temperature, and water chemistry-and to do so in a manner that effectu-
ates economies of scale and allows selective application of effort." 1970 REPORT OF
Tim FEDEAL WATER QuALry ADmiba'AToN in 1 ECON. OF CLEAN WATER 143
(1970).
71. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-983 (West 1971); see Robie, Water Pollu-
tion: An Affirmative Response by the California Legislature, 1 PAc. L.. 2 (1970).
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provides that a regional water quality control board may impose a fine
on a local agency which does not properly treat its sewage.72 As early
as 1967 a bill was introduced which would have enabled a joint powers
agency to finance a water and sewage treatment and disposal system
with revenue bonds, 73 but it was not passed.
Finally, in 1970 the legislature reluctantly enacted a provision
which allowed a joint powers agency formed by the County of San Ber-
nardino and any city therein to issue bonds for the construction of sani-
tary sewage facilities.74  The provision expired on January 1, 1971,
and was enacted solely to allow the City of San Bernardino to finance,
by lease-purchase agreement, an addition to its sewage treatment facil-
ity.
75
In 1971, a legislative proposal was developed by the California
Sanitary and Sanitation Districts Association in an attempt to provide
revenue bond financing for facilities constructed by a joint powers
agency. 76 At the time, a joint powers agency was not eligible to issue
revenue bonds77 under the Revenue Bond Law of 1941, nor could
members of a joint powers agency issue revenue bonds and contribute
the proceeds to the agency. 78 Therefore, the only means by which a
joint powers agency could obtain bond proceeds for construction of a
sewage treatment facility was for the members of the agency to issue
general obligation bonds (requiring a two-thirds vote) and contribute
the proceeds to the agency.
72. CAL. WATER CODE § 13350 (West 1971) ($6,000 fine for each day a viola-
tion occurs).
73. Cal. S.B. 655 (1967).
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6546.5 (West Supp. 1971).
75. Official Statement, San Bernardino Public Safety Authority, June 1, 1970.
Notwithstanding the motives involved, the price and complexity of adequate sewage
treatment plants caused many smaller local agencies to consider joining with others to
jointly construct the facilities. For example, the cities of Morgan Hill and Gilroy
entered into a joint powers agreement to construct a sewage treatment plant. Gilroy
Resolution No. 1179 (Oct. 19, 1967). Gilroy made its contribution in cash and Mor-
gan Hill used the proceeds of a general obligation bond election.
76. The proposal was of special interest to the South East Regional Reclama-
tion Authority in Orange County. This Authority is a joint powers agency consisting
of two cities, two California water districts, a counly water district, and two sanitary
districts. The authority was formed to "jointly plan on a regional basis, facilities
for the collection, treatment, reclamation and when necessary, disposal of sewage."
Letter from Alexander Bowie to William K. Norris, Executive Director, California
Sanitary and Sanitation Districts Ass'n, Mar. 10, 1971.
77. See CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 54301.1, 54307 (Wes, 1966).
78. California Legislative Counsel Opinion No. 18203 states in part: "We think
that the provisions of the Revenue Bond Law of 1941 contemplate that the agency
issuing the bonds will be the owner and maintain primary control of a project con-
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The problem was resolved by the enactment of Chapter 464,79
which provided that a joint powers agency made up of units of govern-
ment otherwise empowered to construct sewage treatment facilities
could issue 1941 revenue bonds for the purpose of constructing sew-
age facilities. This act, unlike previous legislation regarding joint pow-
ers financing of sewage treatment and unlike the California Sanitary and
Sanitation District Association's proposal, did not provide for financing
by use of the joint powers revenue bond. Rather, the act merely de-
fined a joint powers agency as an agency empowered to issue revenue
bonds under the 1941 Revenue Bond Act. It was thought that by
placing the bond provision under the 1941 Act, thus providing for a
vote on the bonds, it would be merely an extension of the familiar rev-
enue bond form of sewage system financing.
This new provision can be used by local agencies in two ways.
First it could be used by several agencies, acting as a joint powers
agency, to finance a sewage treatment facility in common, with the
bonds being paid off by the actual revenues of the system. Secondly,
it could be used, as the San Bernardino provision was used, 0 to allow a
single agency to finance its treatment facility by means of lease-pur-
chase.
Electrical Generating and Transmission
Another significant extension of the uses of joint powers financing
has recently been proposed, but not yet enacted, in the field of electrical
generating and transmission. California law gives cities81 and some
special districts"' the authority to generate and distribute electricity.
Currently, some fifteen cities and several special districts exercise this
authority: some generating their own electric power, and some pur-
chasing their power from the federal government or private power com-
panies. In 1933 the voters approved the Central Valley Project Act,8 3
structed or acauired with bond proceeds . . . and there is no authorization for the
agency issuing the bonds to contribute the proceeds of the bonds to another agency for
construction or acquisition of a project."
79. Senate Bill 1056, enacted as Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 464, at 850 (West Cal.
Legis. Serv.).
80. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
81. CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 9(a); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 39732 (West 1968).
82. E.g., municipal utility districts, CAL. PuB. UTL. CODE § 12801 (West 1965);
public utility districts, id. § 16461; irrigation districts, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 22115-22
(West 1956).
83. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 1042.
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which set up an electrical generating and distributing system and
granted preference in the sale of power to publicly owned utilities.
Several agencies which do operate electrical systems have formed
the Northern California Power Association-a joint powers agency-
to investigate the development of joint facilities for supplying power to
its members. This agency, if authorized by its members, has the au-
thority to construct an electric generating and transmission system; how-
ever, it has no authority to issue bonds for that purpose.8 4 Additionally,
1941 revenue bonds are not available for use.85 Hence, in order to ob-
tain financing for a jointly-constructed power generating and transmis-
sion system, each member agency would have to individually issue gen-
eral obligation bonds (requiring a two-thirds vote) and contribute the
money to the joint venture.
The first attempt, which was unsuccessful, to include power gen-
erating under joint powers revenue bonds was in 1970, when a bill 6
was introduced which would have allowed local agencies to issue bonds
under the 1941 Revenue Bond Act to generate, produce, transmit and
distribute electricity. In addition, under this proposal joint powers
agencies consisting entirely of members having the power to generate
electricity would have been given the authority to issue bonds for that
purpose. The vehicle proposed to grant revenue bond authority to the
joint powers agency was not the Joint Powers Revenue Bond Act, but
rather the 1941 Revenue Bond Act. Therefore, any bond issuance by
a joint powers agency would have to be ratified by a majority vote of
the voters residing within the jurisdiction of the joint powers agency.
In 1971, substantially the same legislation was introduced,8 T allow-
ing both revenue bonds by a single agency and by a joint powers
84. A joint powers agency may exercise any power which its members may exer-
cise separately. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6502 (West 1966). However, electric generating
and transmission facilities are not included in the enumeration of purposes for which
bonds may be issued. See id. § 6546 (West Supp. 1971).
85. See id. § 54310 (West 1966).
86. Cal. S.B. 663 (1970).
87. Cal. S.B. 1373 (1971). Senate Bill 1373 was passed by the Senate, 1971
CAL. SENATE J. 6540; recommended for passage by the Assembly Committee on
Planning and Land Use, 1971 CAL. ASSEMBLY J. 10507; and refused passage by the
Assembly, id. at 12181. This bill contained provisions which would have expanded the
use of joint powers bonds to include electric generating facilities. In the Senate Local
Government Committee the bill was amended to include the provisions of Assembly
Bill 1261. 1971 CAL. SENATE J. 3461. This amendment did not satisfy the opposition
which consisted of the private power companies and those members of the committee
who wanted to see joint powers bonds put to a majority vote. Finally, the bill was
amended to provide that the petition for referendum on the authorization to enter into
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agency. However, in this bill, unlike the 1970 proposal, the joint pow-
ers revenue bond act was used, resulting in the ability to issue such
bonds without a vote. This bill was passed by the Senate but killed by
the Assembly. Also significant is the deletion in committee of the word
"distribution" from the scope or projects permissible under the bond
provisions. This change would have required the facilities constructed
to be connected to a distribution system owned and financed by an in-
dividual local agency and not financed by the joint powers bonds. This
would have discouraged the use of lease-purchase financing for electri-
cal systems and would have been instrumental in restricting the use of
bonds to those aspects of an electrical system-generating and trans-
mission-which are intergovernmental in nature.
Suggested Changes in the Use of Joint Powers Bonds
The California law should be changed:88 (1) to provide an or-
derly and fair limitation on the authorizing of joint powers revenue
bonds to insure their use for truly revenue producing projects; and (2)
to expand the use of these bonds in their proper role of intergovern-
mental financing. The joint powers bonds should be, as is now the
practice, issued by the joint powers agency after being authorized by
the member entities without a vote of the electorate, with the joint pow-
ers agreement subject to referendum. However, certain steps should
be taken to discourage the use of joint powers bonds in conjunction
with lease-purchase agreements. First, a majority vote should be re-
quired on any lease-purchase agreement which is subject to payment
out of the general fund. Second, the vote required to authorize
general obligation bonds should be reduced from two-thirds to a simple
majority.8 9 This would effectively lessen the desirability of the use of
joint powers bonds in lieu of general obligation bonds by eliminating
their advantages and thus encourage their use only for multijurisdic-
tional revenue-producing projects.
The result of the above changes would be that joint powers bonds
would not be resorted to except in those cases in which a true inter-
a joint powers agreement to issue revenue bonds had to be signed by 5 percent, rather
than 10 percent, of the registered voters of the member entity. As last amended, how-
ever, this lower percentage applied only to electric generating bonds and those special
districts not already provided with a referendum procedure. 1971 CAL. SENATE 3. 4499.
88. Senator Milton Marks (R-San Francisco) has introduced Senate Bill 298
into the 1972 session which contains the authors' recommendations.
89. See SOKOLOW, supra note 14; Marini, Local Bond Elections in California-
the Two-Thirds Majority Requirement (University of California, Berkeley, Institute of
Governmental Studies, 1963).
JOINT POWERS REVENUE BONDSMarch 19721
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
governmental need exists for the bonds. With the elimination of the
general misuse of the joint powers bonds, the legislature would be more
prone to greatly expand the purposes for which they can be used. Ref-
use disposal, electric generating, and transportation systems are only a
few of the many projects which often are best handled on a multijuris-
dictional level. Such changes would strengthen the joint powers rev-
enue bond as an effective tool for intergovernmental financing.
Conclusion
Over the past several years there have been proposals to use joint
powers revenue bonds to finance sewage treatment facilities,90 electric
generating, 9' a heliport,92 a regional park,93 an airport,94 storm drain
and flood control projects,95 refuse disposal facilities,9 6 and a municipal
water system97 in California. None except the sewage treatment and
water system provisions have been enacted by the legislature. Recent
proposals to expand the use of joint powers financing, however, differ
markedly from existing uses and show a hopeful trend for the future.
These uses embody two desirable characteristics which should be implic-
it in the term "joint powers revenue bonds": (1) the projects pro-
posed are truly revenue producing in that they are secured only by actual
project revenue and do not encumber the general fund of a local agency,
either directly or indirectly; (2) the projects for which the bonds are
being issued are truly the result of a joint effort between two govern-
ment agencies.
The expansion of the use of joint powers bonds into many areas
where the bonds are presently unavailable would be desirable if the
"bond issue. . . by its terms could never become a charge on the gen-
eral funds or property of a municipality . . . ."98 In other words,
there should be a return to a proper distinction between revenue bonds
and general obligation bonds99 so that joint powers revenue bonds will
90. See text accompanying notes 73-80 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
92. Cal. S.B. 329 (1969).
93. Cal. S.B. 330 (1969).
94. Cal. S.B. 656 (1967).
95. Cal. A.B. 1841 (1968).
96. Cal. S.B. 654 (1967).
97. Cal. A.B. 1686 (1971). See also Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1603 (West Cal.
Legis. Serv.).
98. City of Redondo Beach v. Taxpayers, 54 Cal. 2d 126, 131, 352 P.2d 170,
173, 5 Cal. Rptr. 10, 14 (1960).
99. Revenue bonds have traditionally been defined as bonds which are secured by
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be used only for revenue producing projects. This can be accomplished
either by prohibiting the use of lease-purchase agreements with joint
powers revenue bonds or by imposing restrictions upon such agreements
commensurate with their general obligation use. In addition, joint
powers revenue bonds, along with the no-vote provision, should be re-
tained for truly revenue producing projects to encourage their use when
needed for solving multijurisdictional problems.
Once joint powers bonds are properly restricted and no longer at-
tractive as a substitute for the general obligation bond, it is likely that
the bonds would be expanded in their application to many new areas.
Used properly, joint powers revenue bonds offer an excellent means of
solving many of the pressing multijurisdictional problems in California.
a "special fund," as opposed to general obligation bonds which are secured by the
general taxing powers of the local governmental entity. See City of Redondo Beach v.
Taxpayers, 54 Cal. 2d 126, 131, 352 P.2d 170, 173, 5 Cal. Rptr. 10, 14 (1960);
City of Palm Springs v. Ringwald, 52 Cal. 2d 620, 342 P.2d 898 (1959); City of Ox-
nard v. Dale, 45 Cal. 2d 729, 290 P.2d 859 (1955); Garrett v. Swanton, 216 Cal. 220,
13 P.2d 725 (1932). See also L. CHERmAX, THE LAW OF REvENTE BoNDs 92 (1954).
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